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O P I N I O N  
   
 
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The ―stay-put‖ provision of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (―IDEA‖) states that a disabled 
child shall remain in his or her current educational setting 
     
 
 *Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior United States 
Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
sitting by designation. 
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 during the pendency of proceedings to resolve a dispute over 
the child‘s placement.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).  This case 
requires us to decide two issues of first impression in this 
Circuit concerning the obligation of school districts to pay for 
private school education during that interim period:  (1) 
whether parents are eligible for reimbursement for private 
school costs if they do not file a claim seeking payment until 
after a court has ruled in favor of the school district, and (2) 
whether the right to interim funding, if applicable, extends 
through the time of a judicial appeal. 
 
 The district court answered both questions in the 
affirmative.  It thus held that defendant Ridley School District 
(―Ridley‖) must reimburse the plaintiff parents for the cost of 
roughly three years of their daughter‘s private school tuition 
notwithstanding judicial findings disagreeing with the hearing 
officer – rendered before the parents sought payment – that 
Ridley had complied with the IDEA by offering the child a 
free, appropriate education in its own schools. 
 
 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district 
court‘s judgment. 
I.  
 This court has previously described in detail the 
dispute between Ridley and the plaintiffs – M.R. and J.R. – 
over the educational placement of plaintiffs‘ daughter, E.R.  
See Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 264-67 (3d Cir. 
2012) (―Ridley I‖).  We briefly review here the factual and 
procedural background pertinent to the legal issues now 
before us. 
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 E.R. attended kindergarten and first grade at Grace 
Park Elementary School in the Ridley School District during 
the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 school years, receiving special 
services to address her learning disabilities and health-related 
problems.  During the summer after first grade, plaintiffs 
concluded that the public school was not meeting their 
daughter‘s needs, and they enrolled her at a private school, 
Benchmark, that specializes in educating students with 
learning disabilities.  Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint 
with the Pennsylvania Department of Education claiming, 
inter alia, that Ridley had violated the IDEA and the 
Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide E.R. with a suitable 
Individualized Education Program (―IEP‖), thereby denying 
her the ―free appropriate public education‖ (―FAPE‖) 
required by those laws.
1
 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 29 
                                              
1
 The IDEA requires school districts to develop IEPs for 
children with disabilities to specify how they will be provided 
with a FAPE.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (detailing the framework 
for evaluating a child and creating an IEP).  The statute 
describes a FAPE as ―special education and related services‖ 
that— 
 
(A) have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision and direction, and 
without charge; 
 
(B) meet the standards of the State educational 
agency; 
 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary school, or secondary school 
education in the State involved; and 
5 
 
U.S.C. § 794.
2
  Among other remedies, plaintiffs sought 
reimbursement for the cost of sending E.R. to Benchmark for 
second grade.
3
 
 
 On April 21, 2009, an administrative hearing officer 
found that Ridley had committed no violations during E.R.‘s 
kindergarten year, but that E.R. was denied a FAPE for part 
of first grade and all of second grade.  The hearing officer 
                                                                                                     
 
(D) are provided in conformity with the 
individualized education program required 
under [20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)].   
 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
 
2
 Section 794, more familiarly known as Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, prohibits discrimination in public schools 
– among other federally funded programs – on the basis of 
disability.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(B); see also 34 C.F.R. § 
104.33(a).  We explained in Ridley I that ―§ 504‘s ‗negative 
prohibition‘ is similar to the IDEA‘s ‗affirmative duty‘‖ and 
also requires schools that receive federal financial assistance 
to provide qualified students with a FAPE.  See 680 F.3d at 
280 (quoting W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 1995), 
abrogated on other grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. 
Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
 
3
 In moving E.R. to private school without the school 
district‘s acquiescence, the parents were initially responsible 
for her tuition and other costs.  At issue in this case is the 
extent, if any, of the school district‘s reimbursement 
obligation. 
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awarded compensatory education for the 2007-2008 school 
year (when E.R. attended first grade at the public school) and 
ordered Ridley to reimburse the plaintiffs for the tuition and 
transportation costs associated with E.R.‘s enrollment at 
Benchmark in 2008-2009.
4
 Nearly two years later, in 
February 2011, a federal district court reversed the hearing 
officer‘s placement assessment, finding that Ridley‘s 
proposed IEP was adequate and, hence, that the school district 
had offered E.R. a FAPE in the local public school.  This 
court affirmed the district court‘s ruling on May 17, 2012.  
See Ridley I, 680 F.3d at 283. 
 
 Meanwhile, in March 2011, after filing their appeal 
from the district court‘s judgment, plaintiffs sent a letter to 
the school district requesting payment for E.R.‘s Benchmark 
costs from the date of the hearing officer‘s decision forward – 
at that point, from April 2009 through spring 2011 – pursuant 
to the IDEA‘s stay-put provision.  See infra Section II 
(describing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) and related authority).  When 
the school district declined to pay, plaintiffs responded with 
this action claiming that the IDEA required Ridley to finance 
E.R.‘s private placement until all appeals had concluded in 
the previous litigation over the adequacy of her IEP. 
 
  Ridley denied responsibility for the Benchmark 
expenses on both procedural and substantive grounds.  The 
school district asserted that the demand for interim tuition 
was barred at the threshold because it was untimely.  This 
argument relied on three theories: res judicata, the 
                                              
4
 E.R. remained at Benchmark for third, fourth and fifth 
grades as the case progressed through the courts, and her 
parents paid her tuition. 
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compulsory counterclaim requirement of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 13, and the statute of limitations.  Ridley also 
contended that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because, 
by the time of their second IDEA lawsuit, the district court 
had already held that Ridley had properly designated the local 
public school as E.R.‘s appropriate placement.  The school 
district argued, in effect, that its validated placement 
determination had become the baseline for determining the 
parents‘ entitlement to a remedy and, accordingly, the IDEA 
did not provide for recovery of the private school costs. 
   
 On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the 
district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs.  The court rejected 
each of Ridley‘s timeliness contentions and concluded that 
the IDEA‘s stay-put provision entitled the parents to 
reimbursement for the costs they incurred to send E.R. to 
Benchmark for the entire period they had requested.  The 
costs at issue – $57,658.38, as stipulated by the parties – 
covered the approximately three years from the hearing 
officer‘s decision in April 2009 through proceedings in the 
court of appeals (which had by then concluded with this 
court‘s 2012 decision affirming the district court‘s judgment).   
 
 This appeal followed.  Ridley again challenges both 
the timeliness of plaintiffs‘ reimbursement claim and the legal 
basis for the award.  Our review of the district court‘s 
judgment on the pleadings is de novo.  See Sheridan v. NGK 
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 259 n.25 (3d Cir. 2010).     
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II. 
 The premise of the IDEA is that parents and schools 
working together to design an IEP is the ideal way to reach 
the statute‘s goal of a FAPE for every child.  See Ridley I, 680 
F.3d at 269; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 
(2005).  Congress anticipated, however, that ―the 
collaborative process‖ may at times break down.  Ridley I, 
680 F.3d at 269.  Hence, the Act allows either party to 
respond to a stalemate in the discussions by requesting an 
impartial due process hearing before a state or local 
administrative officer.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Sch. Comm. 
of Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368-
69 (1985) (―Burlington”); Ridley I, 680 F.3d at 269.  A 
variety of disputes may arise concerning placement.  For 
example, the parents may argue for removing the child from 
public school because they believe the services are 
inadequate.  Or the school district might argue for the same 
result, over the parents‘ objection, because it considers the 
child too disruptive to be in a regular school setting.  
Alternatively, either party could be advocating for public-
school placement – with the school district insisting that an 
expensive specialized private school is unnecessary or the 
parents insisting that participation in a regular classroom is 
essential for their child‘s development.  See generally Honig 
v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323-26 (1988) (discussing school 
system‘s limited authority to exclude disabled students); 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (stating that one purpose of the 
stay-put provision ―was to prevent school officials from 
removing a child from the regular classroom over the parents‘ 
objection pending completion of the review proceedings‖);  
id. at 369-70 (discussing whether parents are entitled to 
reimbursement for private school tuition); Drinker v. Colonial 
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Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 861-63 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing 
parents‘ objection to school district‘s plan to move child from 
a placement outside the district to a local public school). 
  
 The parties have the right to seek state or federal court 
review of the administrative decision, 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(A), and – under the provision at issue in this case – 
the child has the right to remain in his or her ―then-current 
educational placement‖ during the pendency of the dispute 
resolution proceedings, id. § 1415(j).  Section 1415(j) states, 
in pertinent part: 
 
[D]uring the pendency of any 
proceedings conducted pursuant 
to this section, unless the State or 
local educational agency and the 
parents otherwise agree, the child 
shall remain in the then-current 
educational placement of the child 
. . . .
5
 
 
This provision, known as the IDEA‘s ―stay-put rule,‖ serves 
―in essence, as an automatic preliminary injunction,‖ Drinker,  
78 F.3d at 864, reflecting Congress‘s conclusion that a child 
with a disability is best served by maintaining her educational 
status quo until the disagreement over her IEP is resolved, 
Pardini v. Allegheny Interm. Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 
2005); Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864.  ―‗Once a court ascertains the 
student‘s current educational placement, the movants are 
                                              
5
  The stay-put provision was previously codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(3).  Its language did not change when it was 
moved.   
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entitled to an order [maintaining that placement] without 
satisfaction of the usual prerequisites to injunctive relief.‘‖  
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting Woods v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Educ., No. 93-5123, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 
(LRP Publications) 439, 440 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 1993)); see 
also Pardini, 420 F.3d at 188 (―Congress has already 
balanced the competing harms as well as the competing 
equities‖); Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 
1982) (―The statute substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the 
status quo for the court‘s discretionary consideration of the 
factors . . . .‖). 
 
 The stay-put rule thus requires that the child‘s 
placement under the IDEA at the time a disagreement arises 
between the parents and the school district – what the statute 
terms the ―then-current educational placement‖ – be protected 
while the dispute is pending.  To determine that placement, 
this court has looked to the IEP ―actually functioning when 
the ‗stay put‘ is invoked.‖  Drinker, 78 F.3d at 867 (citing 
Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625-26 (6th 
Cir. 1990)); see also Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee S., 96 
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1996) (―Raelee S.‖).  The operative 
placement could be either a public school or a private school 
that the local district was financing to satisfy the requirement 
that every child be given a free, appropriate education.  See, 
e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 
(1993) (―Congress intended that IDEA‘s promise of a ‗free 
appropriate public education‘ for disabled children would 
normally be met by an IEP‘s provision for education in the 
regular public schools or in private schools chosen jointly by 
school officials and parents.‖); Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 86 
(noting that providing a FAPE may involve ―‗placement in 
11 
 
private schools at public expense‘‖ (quoting Burlington, 471 
U.S. at 369)).
6
 
  
 The stay-put provision‘s protective purpose means that 
―it is often invoked by a child‘s parents in order to maintain a 
placement where the parents disagree with a change proposed 
by the school district.‖  See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83.  During 
―the pendency‖ of the dispute process, the child is entitled to 
remain in her IEP-specified educational setting.
7
  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(j).  Where the parents seek a change in 
placement, however, and unilaterally move their child from 
an IEP-specified program to their desired alternative setting, 
the stay-put rule does not immediately come into play.  
Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83.  In such circumstances, the parents 
will be responsible for the costs of the child‘s new placement 
– at least initially. 
  
 The new placement can become the educational setting 
protected by the stay-put rule if the parents and ―the State or 
local educational agency‖ agree to the change.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(j).  Also, importantly, a decision favorable to the 
parents during the administrative review process ―must be 
                                              
6
  If the dispute concerns a child who is applying for initial 
admission to a public school, the child ―shall, with the 
consent of the parents, be placed in the public school 
program‖ until the dispute resolution proceedings have 
concluded.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1514(j);  see also 34 C.F.R. § 
300.518(b). 
 
7
  We have referred to this educational setting as the child‘s 
―pendent placement‖ – a term of art drawn from the language 
of § 1415(j).  See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 80 n.1. 
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treated as an agreement between the State and the parents,‖ 
34 C.F.R. § 300.518(d); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372 
(noting that an administrative decision in favor of the parents 
and private school placement ―would seem to constitute 
agreement by the State to the change of placement‖); Raelee 
S., 96 F.3d at 83 (citing Burlington).
8
  Accordingly, an 
administrative ruling validating the parents‘ decision to move 
their child from an IEP-specified public school to a private 
school will, in essence, make the child‘s enrollment at the 
private school her ―then-current educational placement‖ for 
purposes of the stay-put rule.  Having been endorsed by the 
State, the move to private school is no longer the parents‘ 
unilateral action, and the child is entitled to ―stay put‖ at the 
private school for the duration of the dispute resolution 
proceedings.  See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 83-84. 
 
 Although § 1415(j) does not specify which party pays 
when a child‘s pendent placement becomes a private school 
based on an administrative decision, the school district‘s 
obligation to do so is well established by case law.  See 
Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84, 86.  Hence, the school district is 
                                              
8
  In Raelee S., this court declined to decide whether a 
decision in favor of the parents by a hearing officer – as 
opposed to an administrative appellate panel – ―would 
constitute agreement by the state for purposes of pendent 
placement and tuition reimbursement.‖  See 96 F.3d at 85 n.8.  
The subsequently enacted Department of Education 
regulation addressing pendent placement explicitly includes a 
hearing officer‘s decision within the scope of the pendent-
placement protection, and we now do likewise.  See 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.518(d). 
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obliged to fund a private placement if it was either the 
educational setting prescribed by the current IEP or is 
subsequently designated by a hearing officer or administrative 
appeal official as the appropriate setting to meet a child‘s 
needs.  In this case, the stay-put provision became effective in 
April 2009, when the hearing officer determined that Ridley 
had denied E.R. a FAPE and concluded that Benchmark was 
her appropriate educational setting.  E.R. could thus ―stay 
put‖ at Benchmark at the school district‘s expense while the 
court proceedings were pending.  Because E.R. was entitled 
to reimbursement for her costs at Benchmark beginning in 
April 2009, the parents could have requested that Ridley 
reimburse any tuition they already had paid for the remaining 
portion of the 2008-2009 school year and also could have 
asked the school district to reimburse the Benchmark costs in 
the following years (or pay those amounts as they became 
due). 
 
 At issue in this case is whether the school district‘s 
financial responsibility dissolves if the parents do not request 
reimbursement for their out-of-pocket private school costs 
until after an administrative decision in their favor has been 
reversed by a court upon further review.  Ridley emphasizes 
that the remedial subsection of the IDEA provision that 
authorizes ―[a]ny party aggrieved‖ by the administrative 
ruling to file a civil action allows a court to grant only ―such 
relief as the court determines is appropriate.‖  20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(A), (i)(2)(C)(iii).
9
  The school district maintains 
                                              
9
  A civil action may be brought with ―respect to the 
[administrative] complaint,‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), and 
complaints may be filed ―with respect to any matter relating 
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of 
14 
 
that it was inappropriate in this case to award reimbursement 
for private schooling that the district court had found 
unnecessary by the time the request for payment was made.  
Ridley argues that the court ruling returned E.R.‘s placement 
to Grace Park Elementary School with respect to the school 
district‘s funding obligation, eliminating the justification for 
any interim reimbursement.  Ridley further asserts that, even 
if we conclude that interim reimbursement is required under 
the IDEA, any obligation for interim funding does not include 
the period of the appeal to the Third Circuit.  
 
 Before confronting those merits arguments, we address 
Ridley‘s procedural claims. 
 
III.      
Ridley asserts that E.R.‘s parents should have demanded 
tuition reimbursement for their daughter‘s pendent placement 
as part of the relief they requested through counterclaims in 
the earlier action, which was filed by the school district to 
challenge the hearing officer‘s ruling.  Ridley offers a trio of 
rationales to support its contention that plaintiffs‘ request for 
reimbursement should be denied as untimely.  We find none 
of them persuasive. 
 
A.  Res judicata 
 Ridley argues that plaintiffs, having failed to assert 
their claim for reimbursement in the earlier IDEA lawsuit 
between the same parties, may not do so in this subsequent 
                                                                                                     
the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education to such child,‖ id. § 1415(b)(2)(B)(6)(A). 
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action under the principles of res judicata, or claim 
preclusion.  To rely on the affirmative defense of res judicata, 
a party must establish three elements: (1) a final judgment on 
the merits in a prior proceeding that involved (2) the same 
parties or their privies and (3) the same ―cause of action.‖  
See, e.g., Duhaney v. Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 
2010); Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 260 (explaining that ―the central 
purpose of the [res judicata] doctrine [is] to require a plaintiff 
to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a 
single suit‖ (third alteration in original) (internal quotation 
mark omitted)).  The first two elements are not disputed.  In 
examining the similarity of the claims (the third element), we 
focus on ―whether the acts complained of [are] the same, 
whether the material facts alleged in each suit [are] the same 
and whether the witnesses and documentation required to 
prove such allegations [are] the same.‖  United States v. 
Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
 We agree with the district court that the reimbursement 
claim in this case differs materially from the issues addressed 
in Ridley I.  Although both cases concern the rights of E.R. 
and her parents under the IDEA, the similarity ends there.  
Ridley I focused on the substance of an appropriate education 
for E.R., while the current case is a payment dispute over 
E.R.‘s stay-put expenses.  The former was fact-intensive, 
requiring the courts to review testimony and documentary 
evidence about E.R.‘s needs and the school district‘s plans for 
meeting them, while the latter is centered on the legal 
question of financial responsibility and the undisputed fact 
that a hearing officer ruled in plaintiffs‘ favor.10  That the 
                                              
10
  The second action theoretically also involves fact-finding 
on the cost of E.R.‘s pendent placement at Benchmark, but 
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cases are related does not erase these significant differences 
between the causes of action at issue.  Indeed, this court 
previously has recognized, albeit in the different context of 
collateral-order review, that ―resolution of [pendent- 
placement and tuition-reimbursement rights] is completely 
separate from the merits issues which focus on the adequacy 
of the proposed IEP.‖   Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 81 n.4 (allowing 
appeal of pendent-placement ruling as a collateral order 
subject to review under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan 
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)); see also A.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of 
Educ., 727 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a stay-
put order ―resolves an important issue completely separate 
from the merits of the child‘s ultimate placement‖). 
 
 We therefore conclude that the res judicata doctrine 
does not bar this action. 
 
B.   The Compulsory Counterclaim Rule 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) requires a party 
to assert as a counterclaim any cause of action that is 
available against the opposing party that ―arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party‘s claim.‖  The failure to plead a compulsory 
counterclaim bars a later independent action on that claim.  
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 
(1974); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 882 
(5th Cir. 1998); 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
                                                                                                     
the parties have stipulated to the amount at issue. Moreover, 
evidence proving tuition and transportations costs is plainly 
distinct from the evidence needed for the merits issues in 
Ridley I.  
17 
 
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1417, at 
147 (3d ed. 2010). 
 
 The inquiry to determine if a claim is compulsory 
under Rule 13(a) is ―whether the counterclaim ‗bears a logical 
relationship to an opposing party‘s claim.‘‖  Transamerica 
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 
F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Xerox Corp. v. SCM 
Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1978)).    This court has 
stated that a logical relationship exists ―where separate trials 
on each of the[] respective claims would involve a substantial 
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the courts.‖  
Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 
631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961); see also Transamerica, 292 F.3d at 
389-90.  The compulsory counterclaim inquiry thus requires 
essentially the same comparison between claims as the res 
judiciata analysis.  See Transamerica, 292 F.3d at 391 (noting 
―the close connection between Rule 13(a) and the doctrine of 
claim preclusion‖). 
 
 As discussed above, despite a relationship between the 
two lawsuits, there is no meaningful overlap between the 
facts and law underlying the different claims at issue.  Cf. 
Ross v. Bd. of Educ., 486 F.3d 279, 283-84 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that current claims under Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
were compulsory counterclaims in a prior suit where both 
lawsuits ―deal with [the school district‘s] placement 
decisions, the services it offered [the plaintiff], and its 
response to her disability‖).  Plaintiffs were therefore not 
compelled to advance their pendent-placement reimbursement 
demand by means of a counterclaim.  
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 Moreover, as the district court observed, Rule 13(a) 
―effectively operates as a waiver,‖ M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 
No. 11-2235, 2012 WL 3279230, at *7 (Aug. 13, 2012) 
(Ridley II), and this court previously has expressed doubt that 
―parents can lose their stay put protection except by 
affirmative agreement to give it up,‖ Drinker, 78 F.3d at 868.  
E.R.‘s parents did not explicitly agree to forgo their child‘s 
stay-put rights.  Hence, as in Drinker, ―even assuming that in 
a proper case the stay put provision can be waived, we find 
nothing in the record here that leads us to believe this is such 
a case.‖  Id. 
 
 Accordingly, Rule 13(a) does not foreclose this 
independent action seeking reimbursement for E.R.‘s interim 
placement expenses.  We emphasize, however, that our 
conclusion that neither res judicata nor Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13(a) bars the instant action does not mean that 
claims for stay-put reimbursement should not be brought in 
the same civil action with substantive IDEA claims, such as 
those addressing the child‘s placement or the provision of a 
FAPE.  We hold only that, in the context of this case, 
plaintiffs were permitted to bring them separately. 
 
C.  Statute of Limitations 
 Ridley argues that plaintiffs‘ claim is barred by the 
IDEA provision requiring ―[a]ny party aggrieved‖ by a 
hearing officer‘s decision to file suit within ninety days of 
that decision.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (B).  As the 
district court concluded, that statutory limitations period does 
not by its terms apply to plaintiffs‘ stay-put reimbursement 
claim.  Although the parents did seek reversal of the hearing 
19 
 
officer‘s decision on certain issues,11 they had prevailed on 
the issue of E.R.‘s placement at Benchmark for second grade.  
That favorable decision included an award of E.R.‘s tuition 
and transportation costs for 2008-2009 and, under the stay-put 
provision, made Benchmark E.R.‘s pendent placement going 
forward with the right to interim tuition reimbursement.
12
  
Hence, the parents were not aggrieved by the hearing 
officer‘s decision on the issue raised in this case. Ridley 
points to no other applicable limitations period, and we 
therefore reject its statute-of-limitations defense to plaintiffs‘ 
claim. 
 
 
                                              
11
  Their pleading in response to Ridley‘s Petition for Review 
alleged, inter alia, that the hearing officer had erred in finding 
that Ridley did not deny E.R. a FAPE for the 2006-2007 
school year and in finding that she was not improperly denied 
extended programming for the summer of 2007. 
 
12
  After the courts reversed the hearing officer‘s ruling that 
E.R.‘s IEP for the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 school years 
was inadequate, plaintiffs were no longer entitled to 
reimbursement for the costs of E.R.‘s second grade year at 
Benchmark (2008-2009) based on the school district‘s failure 
to provide her a FAPE.  At issue in this case is whether the 
stay-put provision gives them a separate basis to recoup a 
portion of their costs for that year (from the date of the 
hearing officer‘s decision in April 2009 through the end of 
the school year), as well as the costs for E.R.‘s enrollment at 
Benchmark through the date of this court‘s decision in May 
2012 (i.e., for the entire 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school 
years and for most of the 2011-2012 school year ). 
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IV. 
 Ridley‘s challenge on the merits also focuses on issues 
of timing.  Its primary argument is that E.R.‘s parents are not 
entitled to any reimbursement under § 1415(j) because they 
filed their claim for payment too late, i.e., after the 
administrative ruling in their favor was reversed by the 
district court.  The school district further argues that, even if 
the parents may recover some of the private school costs, the 
covered period ended with the district court‘s entry of 
judgment rather than at the time of the appeals court‘s 
decision.  Both contentions require us to consider aspects of 
the stay-put right that this court has not previously addressed. 
 
  Ridley‘s assertion that plaintiffs‘ right to 
reimbursement expired when the district court overturned the 
hearing officer‘s decision necessarily depends on two 
assumptions about how the stay-put scheme works.  First, the 
school district maintains that the reimbursement right does 
not ripen until a claim seeking payment is presented to the 
court.  Second, Ridley contends that once the district court 
ruled that Ridley had offered E.R. a FAPE in its public 
schools, Benchmark was no longer E.R.‘s pendent placement.  
In Ridley‘s view, the parents failed to seek payment while the 
private school was designated as E.R.‘s pendent placement 
and, hence, their potential right to reimbursement never 
ripened into an entitlement. 
 
 We consider below Ridley‘s two assumptions: (1) that 
the right to reimbursement ripens only when parents file a 
claim with the court seeking payment, and (2) that E.R.‘s 
relevant educational placement had returned to the public 
school by the time her parents filed their claim.  We then 
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address Ridley‘s argument that the stay-put financing 
obligation lasts only until judgment at the district court. 
 
A. When Does the Right to Reimbursement Accrue?  
 Ridley argues that the IDEA does not automatically 
provide for reimbursement for the cost of private schooling 
during the stay-put period and that parents must make an 
affirmative request to the court for that remedy.  As support, 
the school district cites the IDEA‘s remedial provision, 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which states that a court ―shall 
grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate.‖  Ridley 
infers from that statutory language that parents have no 
entitlement to stay-put reimbursement until a court rules that 
it is ―appropriate.‖ 
 
 We reject this interpretation as inconsistent with the 
IDEA‘s stay-put guarantee and this court‘s prior case law.  
The stay-put provision – titled ―Maintenance of current 
educational placement‖ – directs that ―the child shall remain 
in the then-current educational placement‖ throughout the 
pendency of any proceedings conducted to resolve a dispute 
over the provision of a FAPE.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis 
added).  Ridley does not dispute that the hearing officer‘s 
decision in this case had the effect of switching E.R.‘s 
pendent placement from the public school recommended by 
her IEP to the private Benchmark School.  As noted above, 
see supra Section II, we have expressly held that financing 
goes hand-in-hand with pendent private-school placement: 
 
It is undisputed that once there is a state 
agreement with respect to pendent placement, a 
fortiori, financial responsibility on the part of 
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the local school district follows.  Thus, from the 
point of the [state administrative] decision 
forward . . . [the student‘s] pendent placement, 
by agreement of the state, is the private school 
and [the school district] is obligated to pay for 
that placement. 
 
Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 84; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Schutz, 290 
F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that ―once the parents‘ 
challenge [to a proposed IEP] succeeds . . . , consent to the 
private placement is implied by law, and the requirements of 
§ 1415(j) become the responsibility of the school district‖). 
 
 We have thus recognized that the stay-put provision 
itself impliedly, and necessarily, deems reimbursement for the 
costs of pendent placement in a private school an 
―appropriate‖ remedy.  See Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 87 (―Without 
interim financial support, a parent‘s ‗choice‘ to have his child 
remain in what the state has determined to be an appropriate 
private school placement amounts to no choice at all.‖).  
There is no separate requirement of a court finding of 
appropriateness; rather, the obligation arises automatically 
from a determination that the private school is the protected 
status quo during the period in which the dispute resolution 
process is ongoing.  Indeed, Ridley admitted as much before 
the district court in this case when it acknowledged that the 
court would have been ―obliged‖ to order reimbursement if 
the parents had sought the funds through a timely 
counterclaim.  Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *8 n.8.  We 
think it pointless to insist on a formal demand for interim 
tuition reimbursement when there is no viable response to that 
demand. 
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 Hence, plaintiffs secured the right to reimbursement 
when the hearing officer ruled in their favor in April 2009.  
We must now consider whether that right survived the 
subsequent district court ruling in favor of the school district.  
 
B.  The Current Educational Placement  
 Ridley contends that any reimbursement entitlement 
the parents may have had under § 1415(j) dissolved in 
February 2011, when the district court reversed the hearing 
officer‘s decision.  The school district argues that the court 
ruling ―rendered the hearing officer‘s decision inoperative‖ 
and reinstated the public school as E.R.‘s stay-put placement, 
making the parents ineligible for private-school 
reimbursement at the time they requested payment from the 
school district in March 2011.  At that point, according to 
Ridley‘s theory, the parents‘ unilateral decision to send E.R. 
to Benchmark no longer had the state imprimatur that made 
reimbursement appropriate.  Ridley‘s position thus depends 
on whether the district court‘s ruling in fact recalibrated the 
stay-put assessment.   
  
 This court observed in Drinker that ―‗the dispositive 
factor in deciding a child‘s ―current educational placement‖ 
should be the Individualized Education Program  . . . actually 
functioning when the ―stay put‖ is invoked.‘‖  78 F.3d at 867 
(quoting Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440).  
According to Ridley, plaintiffs did not invoke the stay-put 
until after the district court determined that the school 
district‘s IEP was appropriate and, hence, the original IEP, 
―placing the student in the school district, is the one now 
‗actually functioning.‘‖ 
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 Ridley‘s argument lacks support in the law.  The 
operative placement is not determined by the date the parents 
seek reimbursement for stay-put expenses, but by the date the 
dispute between the parents and the school district ―‗first 
arises‘‖ and proceedings conducted pursuant to the IDEA 
begin.  Id. (quoting Thomas, 918 F.2d at 625).  At the latest, 
the pertinent proceedings in this case began with the parents‘ 
filing of their due process complaint in December 2008, at 
which point E.R.‘s current placement was the public school.  
See A.D., 727 F.3d at 915 (―[A] stay-put placement is 
effective from the date a student requests an administrative 
due process hearing.‖); D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of 
Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2012) (―By filing the [due 
process] petition, A.C. triggered the IDEA‘s ‗stay-put‘ 
requirement.‖).  As described above, however, E.R.‘s 
operative placement switched by law to the private 
Benchmark School when the administrative hearing officer 
agreed with the parents that Ridley had not offered the child a 
FAPE in the public school. 
  
 Nothing in the statute or this circuit‘s law provides a 
basis for changing E.R.‘s stay-put placement back to the 
public school during the pendency of the dispute process, 
notwithstanding the school district‘s successful appeal of the 
administrative decision.  To the contrary, § 1415(j) states that 
the child shall remain in the current educational placement 
―until all [IDEA] proceedings have been completed‖ 
(emphasis added).  We cannot conclude that Congress 
intended a placement based on an agreement with ―the State 
or local educational agency‖ to be less secure than one based 
on an IEP.  Id.  Indeed, any other conclusion would be at odds 
with our expressly stated understanding that the stay-put 
provision is designed to ensure educational stability for 
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children with disabilities until the dispute over their 
placement is resolved, ―‛regardless of whether their case is 
meritorious or not.‘‖  Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting 
Woods, 20 Indiv. Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440) (emphasis 
added); see also A.D., 727 F.3d at 914 (stating that ―a student 
who requests an administrative due process hearing is entitled 
to remain in his educational placement regardless of the 
strength of his case or the likelihood he will be harmed by a 
change in placement‖); Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. 
Dist., 559 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2009) (―[T]he stay put 
provision acts as a powerful protective measure to prevent 
disruption of the child‘s education throughout the dispute 
process.‖); Mackey v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (quoting the Drinker language above). 
  
 Thus, under the statute and this court‘s precedent, 
E.R.‘s pendent placement under § 1415(j) remained the 
Benchmark School through at least the conclusion of the 
proceedings in the district court, and the school district‘s 
correlative obligation to pay for her schooling there also 
remained intact.  The only remaining question is whether 
Ridley‘s financial responsibility extended through final 
judgment in the appeals court. 
 
C.  The Duration of the School District’s Reimbursement 
Obligation 
 
 Ridley asserts that its responsibility to finance E.R.‘s 
pendent placement at Benchmark terminated, at the latest, 
when the district court ruled in favor of the school district on 
plaintiffs‘ IDEA claim.  This court previously has held that § 
1415(j) requires a school district to pay for a private school 
that is a pendent placement through the date of a district 
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court‘s final order in an IDEA case.  See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 
867.  The court has not, however, addressed whether the stay-
put provision also applies through the pendency of an IDEA 
dispute in the Court of Appeals.  The only two circuits to 
have decided the issue in published opinions are split.  
Compare Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1038-40 (holding that stay-
put obligation extends through appeals decision), with 
Andersen v. Dist. of Columbia, 877 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) ((holding that Congress did not intend stay-put 
financing to cover federal appellate review).  See also Kari H. 
v. Franklin Special Sch. Dist., 125 F.3d 855 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(table), 1997 WL 468326, at *6 (Nos. 96-5066, 5178) (Aug. 
12, 1997) (following Andersen); N. Kitsap Sch. Dist. v. K.W., 
123 P.3d 469, 483 (Wash. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that stay-
put period extends ―throughout the entire process, including 
any appeals‖). 
 
 Having now considered the question, we agree with 
the Ninth Circuit – and the district court in this case – that the 
statutory language and the ―protective purposes‖ of the stay-
put provision lead to the conclusion that Congress intended 
stay-put placement to remain in effect through the final 
resolution of the dispute.  Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at 
*11.  The statute‘s text is broadly written to encompass ―the 
pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this 
section.‖  20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis added). Narrowing 
the provision‘s scope to exclude the appellate process strikes 
us as an unnatural reading of such expansive language.  The 
―proceedings‖ specifically covered by § 1415 include civil 
actions in ―a district court of the United States.‖  Id. 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).  The district court reasonably construed that 
reference to include all phases of the federal proceedings that 
begin with a district court filing: ―Although Congress did not 
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explicitly articulate that an appeal is a ‗proceeding‘ under § 
1415, it seems intuitive that an appeal is part of a ‗civil action 
. . . in a district court of the United States.‘  . . .  In drafting § 
1415(j), Congress surely understood that district court review 
would necessarily include an appeal to a circuit court.‖  
Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *11; see also Joshua A., 559 
F.3d at 1038 (―By giving Joshua the right to appeal the ALJ‘s 
decision to the district court, § 1415 also made it possible for 
Joshua to appeal the dispute to this circuit court.‖). 
 
 Even if we had doubts about the clarity of the language 
itself, we would nonetheless adopt the same construction 
because that ―reading . . . ‗best accords with the overall 
purposes of the statute.‘‖ Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162, 
170 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 
103, 116-17 (1990)), overruled on other grounds by Al-Sharif 
v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 734 F.3d 207 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc)); see also Long v. Tommy Hilfiger 
U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that, in 
addition to language and context, we ―consider the ‗overall 
object and policy of the statute, and avoid constructions that 
produce odd or absurd results or that are inconsistent with 
common sense‘‖  (quoting Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. 
Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008))).  We 
have stated consistently that the stay-put provision is 
designed to preserve the status quo ―‗until the dispute with 
regard to [the child‘s] placement is ultimately resolved.‘‖  
Drinker, 78 F.3d at 864 (quoting Woods, 20 Indiv. 
Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. at 440); see also, e.g., Pardini, 420 
F.3d at 190; J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 
272 (3d Cir. 2002).  We cannot sensibly find that a FAPE 
dispute is ―ultimately resolved‖ before proceedings have run 
their course through a final, unappealed decision by an 
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administrative body or an appellate judicial decision.  See 
Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1040 (―It is unlikely that Congress 
intended the protective measure to end suddenly and 
arbitrarily before the dispute is fully resolved.‖). 
 
 Moreover, the rationale that underlies a school 
district‘s obligation to finance a child‘s pendent placement 
remains compelling through the appellate process.  If we 
concluded that stay-put protection terminates while an appeal 
is pending, the parents of a child with disabilities would be 
faced with the untenable choice of removing their child from 
a setting the appeals court might find appropriate or risking 
the burden of private school costs they cannot afford for the 
period of the appeal.  See, e.g., Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1040; 
Raelee S., 96 F.3d at 86-87.  In addition,  
 
cutting off stay-put protection 
after district court review has 
potential negative consequences 
in other factual scenarios besides 
private school placement.  For 
instance, the stay-put provision 
could have been invoked during 
the pendency of an appeal to 
maintain a child‘s special services 
within the school district or to 
maintain a child‘s placement in a 
mainstream rather than a self-
contained classroom. 
 
Ridley II, 2012 WL 3279230, at *12 n.10.  The broad reading 
of § 1415(j) thus aligns with the statute‘s important mission 
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to guarantee educational stability for all children with 
disabilities until there is a final ruling on placement. 
 
 The wisdom of this reading of § 1415(j) is reinforced 
by the Department of Education‘s implementing regulation, 
which states explicitly that the child must remain in his or her 
current educational placement ―during the pendency of ―any . 
. . judicial proceeding regarding a due process complaint.‖  
34 C.F.R. § 300.518(a) (emphasis added).  The unbounded 
reference to ―any‖ judicial proceeding plainly extends the 
mandate through the conclusion of the appellate process, and 
the agency‘s view of the statute‘s reach thus mirrors our own.  
If we had considered § 1415(j) ambiguous on the issue of 
duration, we would have been obliged to give deference to 
this permissible construction by the agency.   See Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984); Castillo v. Att’y Gen., 729 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Every appropriate interpretive path thus leads us to 
the same conclusion. 
 
 The D.C. Circuit in Andersen adopted the contrary 
interpretation based on a view of the IDEA‘s purpose that we 
believe is unjustifiably limited.  The Andersen court focused 
on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Honig v. Doe, where the 
issue was whether school districts may be excused from the 
stay-put requirement when a child‘s continuing presence in 
the classroom poses a danger to himself or others.  See Honig, 
484 U.S. at 323; Andersen, 877 F.2d at 1023-24.  In rejecting 
such an exception,
13
 the Supreme Court observed that ―one of 
                                              
13
     The IDEA does allow certain temporary exceptions to 
the pendent-placement provision, including for students 
carrying a weapon to school, using or selling drugs at school, 
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the purposes of § 1415[(j)] . . . was ‗to prevent school 
officials from removing a child from the regular public school 
classroom over the parents‘ objection pending completion of 
the review proceedings,‘‖ Honig, 484 U.S. at 327 (quoting 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373).  The Court emphasized the 
incompatibility of the asserted unilateral authority to exclude 
students perceived as dangerous with the IDEA‘s goals, see 
id. at 323, 327, and pointed out that school officials faced 
with a safety issue could, among other steps, seek court 
intervention under the IDEA if ―parents of a truly dangerous 
child adamantly refuse to permit any change in placement,‖ 
id. at 326. 
 
  The D.C. Circuit appeared to treat Honig as 
establishing a single goal for the stay-put provision, i.e., ―to 
protect children from unilateral displacement by school 
authorities.‖  877 F.2d at 1024.  The court thus reasoned that 
the automatic stay-put injunction is no longer justified once a 
district court has decided in favor of a proposal by school 
officials to transfer a student: ―Once a district court has 
rendered its decision approving a change in placement, that 
change is no longer the consequence of a unilateral decision 
by school authorities; the issuance of an automatic injunction 
perpetuating the prior placement would not serve the 
section‘s purpose.‖  877 F.2d at 1024.   Based on this 
                                                                                                     
or inflicting serious bodily injury on others.  See 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(k)(1)(G); see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 325 & n.8 (citing 
a Department of Education position that a ten-day suspension 
―does not amount to a ‗change in placement‘ prohibited by § 
1415[(j)]‖). 
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assumption about the role of § 1415(j), the Andersen court 
held that, after a court has endorsed the school district‘s 
educational plan for a disabled child, the child‘s parents may 
prevent a change in placement consistent with the court ruling 
only by satisfying the standard requirements for injunctive 
relief.  Id.     
 
 In our view, there is a flaw in the D.C. Circuit‘s 
reasoning.  The Supreme Court has not declared protection 
from unilateral action by school officials to be the only 
purpose of the stay-put provision.  Rather, the Court 
identified it in Honig as ―one of [the section‘s] purposes.‖  
484 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added); see also id. (describing 
―the unilateral exclusion of disabled children by schools‖ as 
―one of the evils Congress sought to remedy‖ (emphasis in 
first phrase omitted) (emphasis in second phrase added)); 
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373 (―We think at least one purpose 
of § 1415[(j)] was to prevent school officials from removing a 
child from the regular public school classroom over the 
parents‘ objection pending completion of the review 
proceedings.‖ (emphasis added)).   As we have just explained, 
the pendent-placement requirement also reflects a concern 
about the continuity of a child‘s placement generally.  See 
A.D., 727 F.3d at 916  (―[T]he purpose of the stay-put 
provision . . . is to protect students from changes to their 
educational programs when there is a dispute over the 
lawfulness of the changes.‖);  K.W., 123 P.3d at 482 (―[T]he 
holding in Andersen does not follow the general policy 
behind IDEA, which is to keep from disturbing the child 
throughout the statutory process designed to resolve disputes 
between the school district and the child‘s parents or 
guardians over where the child can receive the appropriate 
educational opportunities.‖).  The D.C. Circuit‘s limited 
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perspective in Andersen undermines its conclusion that the 
stay-put protection, which triggers the school district‘s 
reimbursement obligation, does not extend through the period 
of an appeal.
14
 
V. 
 We are not insensitive to the financial burden our 
decision will impose on school districts, see Raelee S, 96 F.3d 
at 87, or the seeming incongruity of the ultimately prevailing 
party having to pay for a now-rejected placement.  Despite 
two judicial determinations that Ridley did not deny E.R. a 
FAPE, the school district will be assessed the cost of her 
private school education for a substantial period of time.
15
  It 
is impossible, however, to protect a child‘s educational status 
quo without sometimes taxing school districts for private 
education costs that ultimately will be deemed unnecessary 
by a court.  We see this not as ―an absurd result,‖ Ridley II, 
2012 WL 3279230, at *13, but as an unavoidable 
consequence of the balance Congress struck to ensure 
stability for a vulnerable group of children. 
 
 Affirmed. 
                                              
14
  The plaintiffs in this case did not seek Supreme Court 
review of the appeals court ruling in Ridley I, and we 
therefore do not address whether stay-put protection 
encompasses such proceedings. 
   
15
  As noted above, the reimbursement period runs from the 
date of the administrative hearing officer‘s decision in April 
2009 – i.e., shortly before the end of the 2008-2009 school 
year – through the date of the appellate decision in May 2012. 
